When geometry emerges: some neglected early contribution to offer-curve analysis by Thomas M. Humphrey







n his 1952 A Geometry of International Trade, Nobel Laureate James
Meade presented the deﬁnitive modern version of the celebrated reciprocal-
demand, or offer-curve, diagram of the trade theorist. The diagram features
curves depicting alternative quantities of exports and imports countries are will-
ing to trade at all possible prices (see Figure 1).
Let two countries, home and foreign, trade two goods, x and y. Measure
quantities of these goods along the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively.
Suppose the home country exports good x and imports good y while the foreign
country does the converse. The slope of any ray from the origin expresses the
relative price of x in terms of y. That is, it expresses the quantity of y exchanged
per unit of x,o ry price of x. Curve H is the home country’s offer curve. Curve F
is the foreigner’s. Each curve shows alternative quantities of imports demanded
and exports supplied at all price ratios or terms of trade.
As drawn, the curves display declining elasticity, or price responsiveness,
throughout their length. They slope upward from left to right when the de-
mand for imports in terms of exports is elastic—that is, when more exports
are offered for imports at successively lower import prices. They cease to
slope upward when import demand becomes unit-elastic. At such points, the
quantity of exports offered for total imports remains unchanged as import
prices fall. They bend backward (or downward) when import demand is in-
elastic. Along such segments, fewer exports are offered for total imports when
import prices fall.
The author thanks Bob Hetzel, Peter Ireland, Tony Kuprianov, Jeff Lacker, and Dawn
Spinozza for their helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed are those of
the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal
Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 81/2 Spring 1995 39    
40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly











Curves H and F show alternative
quantities of exports offered and
imports demanded by each
country at all different price ratios.
Equilibrium occurs at intersection
point P. The slope of ray 0P is the
equilibrium price ratio or terms of
trade. The coordinates of point P
depict the equilibrium quantities
of goods traded.
+
World trade equilibrium occurs at point P, where the offer curves intersect.
At that point, the market-clearing price ratio, or terms of trade, given by the
slope of the ray 0P equates each nation’s import demand with the other’s export
supply. The supply of both commodities equals the demand for them, and the
coordinates of point P show the resulting equilibrium volume of world trade.
The foregoing diagram has proved indispensable in illuminating the cen-
tral ideas of trade theory. Generations of professors and their students have
employed it to demonstrate how the strength and elasticity of each country’s
demand for the other’s product determine the equilibrium volume and terms
of world trade. Likewise, scores of textbooks use it to illustrate how tariffs,
technological advances, resource discoveries, taste changes, and other such
disturbances shift the offer curves and thereby alter world trade equilibrium.
That a simple geometrical diagram would prove so useful is hardly surpris-
ing. Other economic diagrams, including the Keynesian cross, Marshallian scis-
sors, Hicksian IS-LM, Knightian circular ﬂow, Vinerian cost envelope, Fisher-
Haberler production possibility frontier, and expectations-augmented Phillips
Curve, or zero long-run trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment, have
proved equally indispensable. Indeed, as long ago as 1879, Alfred Marshall
insisted that diagrams are absolutely essential to exact reasoning in economics   
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because they yield many of the same results as higher mathematics while being
accessible to the mathematically untrained.
What is surprising is how little has been written on the doctrinal history
of offer curves. Few systematic surveys of that topic exist. Textbooks scarcely
do it justice. Even history-of-thought treatises spotlight at best only a handful
of the chief contributions. Meade himself was largely silent on the diagram’s
history even though it was more than 100 years old when he published his
Geometry.
The development of offer-curve analysis involves some of the leading
names in classical and neoclassical economics. John Stuart Mill, Robert Tor-
rens, Alfred Marshall, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, and Abba Lerner all con-
tributed to the diagram’s development and policy applications. Mill invented
reciprocal-demand schedules. He used them to determine precisely where,
within the limits set by comparative-cost ratios, the terms of trade, or quantity of
imports bought by a unit of exports, must fall. He used them also to estimate the
impact of tariffs and technology shocks on the terms of trade. Torrens likewise
employed such schedules to argue the merits of a policy of reciprocity in tariff
erection and removal. Marshall translated Mill into geometry and examined
the stability of offer-curve equilibria. Edgeworth combined offer curves with
indifference maps to derive the theory of the optimum tariff. Lerner corrected
Edgeworth’s error of alleging an asymmetry between export and import taxes
and also showed how the government’s disposal of the tax receipts inﬂuences
the position of the curves. Finally, Meade completed the analysis by deriving
offer curves from price vectors and trade indifference maps—themselves de-
rived from underlying production possibility frontiers and consumption indif-
ference curves. His demonstration was crucial. It proved once and for all that
domestic production as well as consumption conditions inﬂuence offer curves.
The paragraphs below attempt to trace this evolution and to identify speciﬁc
contributions to it. Besides exhuming lost or forgotten insights, such an exercise
serves as a partial corrective to the tendency of modern trade theory textbooks to
overemphasize Meade’s contribution at the expense of those of his predecessors.
By resurrecting pathbreaking earlier work, the exercise dispels misconceptions
concerning the origins of offer-curve analysis. It establishes that the diagram is
not a twentieth-century innovation. In this connection, it reveals that at least two
of Meade’s predecessors instinctively grasped the concept of offer curves long
before Marshall invented the diagram. It nevertheless indicates that the diagram
played a crucial role in advancing the analysis. By crystallizing, condensing,
and generalizing earlier insights into a powerful yet simple visual image, the di-
agram at once rendered them transparent and easy to comprehend. For evidence
of the diagram’s power to illuminate and enhance earlier work, one need only
refer to Mill’s and Torrens’ laborious verbal and numerical examples. Those
examples convey their full meaning only when translated into geometry. For
this reason, the following paragraphs take the liberty of interpreting Mill and     
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Torrens with the aid of offer-curve diagrams unavailable to them when they
wrote. Such anachronisms involve little distortion when, as is the case here,
they correspond faithfully to the original work.
1. JOHN STUART MILL
Reciprocal-demand, or offer-curve, analysis originated to ﬁll a gap in David
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. Ricardo, in his 1817 volume On
the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, demonstrated (1) that
comparative-cost ratios in each country determine pre-trade relative prices,
(2) that international differences in such prices render trade advantageous, and
(3) that countries therefore trade when their comparative-cost ratios differ, ex-
porting their relatively cheap-to-produce goods and importing their relatively
dear-to-produce ones. Ricardo also indicated that the post-trade terms of trade
must fall somewhere between these limiting cost ratios. He did not, however,
explain what determines the terms of trade or where it would tend to settle. He
merely assumed it would fall roughly halfway between the cost ratios without
explaining why.
Priority for identifying the relative strength of each country’s demand for
the other’s product as the determinant of the terms of trade goes to James
Pennington, Robert Torrens, and, above all, John Stuart Mill. Pennington in
1840 was the ﬁrst to state the point in print. His account, however, was marred
by the notion that volatile reciprocal demands cause the terms of trade to os-
cillate ceaselessly within the limiting cost ratios rather than to achieve a stable
determinate value. Torrens was the ﬁrst to coin the phrase “reciprocal demand”
(see Viner [1937], p. 536). Because he used the concept to argue against uni-
lateral tariff reduction, however, his analysis was condemned by his classical
contemporaries, most of whom were free-traders. Of the three originators of the
reciprocal-demand idea, John Stuart Mill exerted by far the greatest inﬂuence.
His conception of reciprocal demand as a schedule or function of price enabled
him to convey its importance more clearly, systematically, and convincingly
than had Pennington and Torrens. In any case, it was from Mill rather than
from the latter two writers that later economists took the idea.
Reciprocal-Demand Theory
Mill stated the idea ﬁrst in his essay “On the Laws of Interchange Between
Nations,” which he wrote in 1829–30 but did not publish until 1844 in response
to Torrens’ (1841–42) The Budget. He presented it again in Chapter 18 of Book
III of his 1848 Principles of Political Economy. His statement is as modern as
the latest trade textbook.         
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First comes the notion of comparative-cost ratios as limiting values for
the terms of trade.1 Next comes the argument that reciprocal-demand sched-
ules express an inverse relationship between import relative price and quantity
demanded.2 There follows the idea that to each quantity of imports demanded
along a reciprocal-demand schedule there corresponds an associated amount of
exports supplied. This amount equals the product of import price and quantity.
It expresses the condition that a trading country’s export receipts constitute its
means of purchasing imports of the same value.3 In other words, reciprocal-
demand schedules are at once demand-and-supply curves expressing import
demand in terms of export supply.4
Finally comes Mill’s requirement that reciprocal-demand schedules inter-
sect at the equilibrium volume and terms of trade. The latter variable, the
equilibrium price ratio, clears the world goods market such that each coun-
try’s demand for imports equals the other’s export supply. Mill referred to this
equilibrium condition as the Law of International Values.5
Having shown how reciprocal-demand schedules intersect to determine
world trade equilibrium, Mill examined the stability of that equilibrium. In
language familiar to any modern economist, he argued that a displacement of
the terms of trade from its equilibrium value would invoke an excess world
demand for one good and corresponding world excess supply of the other.
These excess demands and supplies would exert corrective pressure on the
terms of trade until it returned to equilibrium.
Clearly, Mill had put his stamp on the diagram just as surely as if he had
drawn it himself. That much is evident from how easily his statements map
into offer-curve space (see Figure 2). Closest to the axes lie the comparative-
cost (CC) lines. Their slopes represent the production substitution, opportunity
cost, and domestic price ratios of the two goods in each country in the absence
of trade. The lines are drawn straight to correspond to the Ricardian or classical
1 “The limits within which the [relative price or exchange ratio between importables and
exportables] is conﬁned, are the ratio between their costs of production in the one country, and
the ratio between their costs of production in the other” ([1844] 1968, p. 12).
2 “The higher the price, the fewer will be the purchasers, and the smaller the quantity sold.
The lower the price, the greater will in general be the number of purchasers, and the greater the
quantity disposed of” ([1844] 1968, p. 9).
3 Let X and M denote export and import quantities and px and pm their money prices. Then,
at each point on a reciprocal-demand schedule, the value of exports supplied pxX equals the value
of imports demanded pmM,o rpxX = pmM. Dividing both sides of this equation by px yields X =
(pm/px)M, which says that the amount of exports offered equals the product of import relative
price and quantity.
4 “The supply brought by the one constitutes his demand for what is brought by the other. So
that supply and demand are but another expression for reciprocal demand” ([1848] 1909, p. 593).
5 “The produce of a country exchanges for the produce of other countries, at such values as
are required in order that the whole of her exports may exactly pay for the whole of her imports.
This law of International Values is but an extension of the more general law of Value, which we
called the Equation of Supply and Demand” ([1848] 1909, p. 592).    
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The schedules H and F follow
the comparative-cost lines over
a range in which the countries
are indifferent to trade. Then
they bend toward equilibrium.
If the terms-of-trade ray lies
below the market-clearing ray
going through the point of offer-
curve intersection, the resulting
excess demands and supplies
restore it to equilibrium.
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assumption of constant marginal and average costs. That the home country’s
line is the ﬂatter of the two indicates that it (the home country) possesses a
comparative-cost advantage in producing the good measured along the hori-
zontal axis. Conversely, the steep slope of the foreigner’s cost line signiﬁes his
comparative-cost advantage in producing the good measured along the vertical
axis.
As for the offer curves, they follow the cost lines over a range in which
the countries are indifferent to trade. Thus if the home country faces world
terms of trade equal to its domestic opportunity cost ratio AB/0A, it cares not
whether it obtains AB units of good y through domestic production or through
foreign trade. Either way, the cost is the same, namely, 0A units of good x.
Likewise, when the terms-of-trade ray coincides with the foreigner’s cost line,
he is equally willing to obtain CD units of good x through trade or domestic
production. In each case, he sacriﬁces 0C units of good y.
At a certain point, however, the offer curves depart from the cost lines.
Thus, at point B, the home country’s curve begins to bend away from its cost
schedule. Precisely at this point, the home country specializes completely in
the production of its exportable, the excess of which it trades for importables to
reach its desired consumption bundle—the same bundle it would consume under     
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self-sufﬁciency. Beyond this point, however, the offer curve bends upward in
response to better terms of trade. The resulting fall in the export price of imports
has a twofold effect. It increases the quantity of imports demanded. And, by
inducing the country to consume fewer exportables, it makes more of those
goods available for sale abroad and so raises the quantity of exports offered.
This latter step is necessary since the country already is at its specialization
point and can produce no more goods for export. A similar analysis holds for
the foreign offer curve, which at point D bends away from its cost line toward
equilibrium.
Equilibrium occurs where the curves intersect. Running through that inter-
section point is a ray from the origin whose slope represents the market-clearing
price ratio or terms of trade. A self-correcting mechanism ensures this equilib-
rium price ratio will prevail. Should a disequilibrium terms of trade such as
that indicated by the slope of the lower dashed ray occur, the result would
be an excess demand for the home country’s exports and an excess supply of
its imports. The resulting rise in export prices and fall in import prices would
restore the equilibrium terms of trade.
Applications
Having derived his reciprocal-demand apparatus, Mill put it to work in analyz-
ing a variety of cases. He showed that where the terms of trade settle between
the autarkic cost lines depends on the relative strength and elasticities of the
reciprocal demands. The greater and more elastic one country’s demand relative
to the other’s, the more the terms of trade would move against the ﬁrst country
and in favor of the second. And in the case of a large country trading with a
small one, he showed that the latter’s offer curve might cut the former’s in its
linear segment. If so, the terms of trade would coincide with the large country’s
cost ratio. All gains from trade would go to the small country, and the large
one would be incompletely specialized in production.
Technological Improvements and the Terms of Trade
He likewise applied his reciprocal-demand technique to predict the terms-of-
trade effects of a cost-reducing improvement in the foreign country’s export
sector (see Figure 3). To do so, he distinguished between elastic, unit-elastic,
and inelastic home import demands. Such elasticities result in greater, un-
changed, and smaller outlays of exports as import prices fall. Accordingly,
they give rise to upward-sloping, vertical, and backward-bending home offer
curves, respectively.
Mill concluded that the improvement would, by raising the supply of ex-
ports relative to the demand for them, turn the terms of trade against the
foreign country by an amount that depended on the home country’s import-
demand elasticity. The improvement lowers the foreigner’s opportunity cost of        
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the foreigner’s offer curve upward.
The extent of his terms-of-trade
deterioration depends on the
elasticity of the home country’s
curve. Conversely, the foreigner’s
trade taxes shift his curve
downward. His terms of trade
improve by an amount that
depends on the elasticity of the
home country’s curve.
+
producing exports. It thus enables him to offer more for any given quantity of
imports. In so doing, it shifts up his offer curve equiproportionally to the cost
reduction.6 The resulting counterclockwise rotation of the equilibrium price ray
constitutes the terms-of-trade deterioration. The deterioration is proportionally
greater than, equal to, or less than the cost reduction as the home offer curve
is inelastic (backward-bending), unitary-elastic (vertical), or elastic (upward-
sloping). Mill’s inelastic case anticipated the modern concept of immiserising
growth in which the adverse terms-of-trade effects of improved productivity
swamp the beneﬁcial output effects and so make the country worse off than
before.
Trade Taxes and the Terms of Trade
Mill also employed his reciprocal-demand apparatus to examine the terms-of-
trade effects of a tax on exports or imports. Despite his aversion to all forms
of trade restriction, he demonstrated that such taxes could improve the levying
6 Mill admitted that this result might not hold exactly if the cost reduction exerted an income
effect on the foreigner’s own demand for his exportable good.   
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country’s terms of trade in proportion to the elasticity of the other’s reciprocal
demand.
Let the foreign government levy the tax and consume the proceeds (see
Figure 3 again). If the tax is on imports, it reduces the demand for them. If it
is on exports, it reduces their supply. Either tax, therefore, causes an equipro-
portionate downward shift in the foreigner’s offer curve and thus improves his
terms of trade. The improvement is in greater, equal, or lesser proportion than
the tax depending on whether the home country’s offer curve is backward-
bending (inelastic), vertical (unit-elastic), or upward-sloping (elastic).
Theoretically, then, trade taxes could improve the terms of trade and thus
national welfare. Nevertheless, Mill opposed them on practical and moral
grounds. In his view, they invite retaliatory duties abroad that nullify the initial
terms-of-trade improvement. Worse still, they bring costly reductions in the vol-
ume of world trade. Even in the absence of retaliation, they are unjust because
they beneﬁt the levying country at the expense of other countries. Since the rest
of the world’s loss exceeds the dutying country’s gain, such taxes are inimical
to global welfare and cannot be justiﬁed from a cosmopolitan standpoint.
Mill’s Failure
The bulk of Mill’s analysis remains as valid today as when he wrote it. Still,
he was not completely successful. He failed to resolve the problems that arise
when offer curves exhibit (1) multiple equilibria and (2) indeterminacy of equi-
librium. The ﬁrst problem arises when the curves intersect more than once; the
second when they coincide over certain ranges. Both phenomena require for
their occurrence inelastic offer curves. Unfortunately, however, Mill chose to
analyze them under the special assumption that the curves are unit-elastic. Nei-
ther Alfred Marshall ([1879] 1975, pp. 148–49) nor Francis Edgeworth (1894a,
pp. 609–14) let this slip pass unnoticed. They pointed out that unit-elastic
curves intersect only once and cannot coincide (see Figure 4). Accordingly,
they concluded that Mill’s choice of unit-elastic curves was useless in resolving
questions of indeterminacy and multiple equilibria.
Mill’s Paradox
Mill was successful, however, in using his unit-elastic schedules to demonstrate
what Akira Takayama (1972, pp. 144–45) calls “Mill’s paradox.” That paradox
states that a country’s gains from trade decline as its resource endowment
expands.
Let the offer curves be unit-elastic beyond the production-specialization
points on the comparative-cost lines (see Figure 5). Suppose that prior to re-
source expansion the foreign curve initially cuts the home curve at its kink.
The result is that the terms of trade coincide with the home country’s cost ratio
and the foreigner reaps all the gains from trade.   
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horizontal and vertical in
the relevant range. They
intersect once. They display
no multiple equilibria or
indeterminacy.
+
Mill then assumes that resource expansion occurs in the foreign country.
Such expansion, provided it raises the output of exportables more than it raises
the foreigner’s own demand for them, shifts upward his production (export-
capacity) point and with it his offer curve. The resulting growth-augmented
curve cuts the unit-elastic segment of the home country’s curve, thus yielding
a terms-of-trade deterioration for the foreigner. In the limit, growth continues
until the terms of trade coincide with the foreigner’s cost ratio and all trade
gains accrue to the home country. Here is the rationale for Mill’s statement
that “the richest countries, ceteris paribus, gain the least by a given amount of
foreign commerce” ([1848] 1909, p. 604).
Assessment
Overall, Mill’s analysis must be judged one of the greatest contributions in
the history of economics. It generalized classical value theory by shifting the
emphasis from cost of production to equilibrium of demand and supply. True,
Mill’s predecessors occasionally acknowledged demand as a determinant of
price. But they did so only for the singular case of nonreproducible goods
in absolutely ﬁxed supply. Mill now extended that analysis to cover labor-
produced goods as well. He showed that even if cost determines the autarkic     
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Growth of the foreigner’s resource
endowment shifts his offer curve
upward. His terms of trade
deteriorate until they eventually
coincide with his cost ratio. Beyond
point Z he ceases to specialize. Z
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value of such goods, as Ricardo claimed, another principle, namely that of recip-
rocal demand, determines their international value. By distinguishing between
cost-determined domestic prices and international prices determined jointly by
supply and demand, he identiﬁed both blades of the Marshallian scissors. True,
it remained for the neoclassical school to elaborate his insight into a full mi-
croeconomic theory of price determination. But Mill clearly pointed the way.
2. ROBERT TORRENS
Mill had shown that with unit-elastic home demand for imports, the foreigner’s
trade tax improves his terms of trade equiproportionally with the tax. Two
years before Mill published his analysis, Robert Torrens (1841–42) indepen-
dently reached this same conclusion in a numerical example presented in his
Postscript to Letter IX of The Budget. There he showed that a 100 percent
import tariff, through its effect on reciprocal demands, improves the levying
country’s terms of trade by the same 100 percent. His example has the foreign
country, Cuba, imposing the tariff on imports of English cloth. His assumption
of unit-elastic reciprocal demands implies that Cuba’s offer curve is horizontal
and England’s curve is vertical in the relevant range (see Figure 6).   
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Cuba’s 100 percent tariff
shifts her offer curve down
from C to C'. Her terms of trade
improve equiproportionally such
that the slope of ray 0t' is half
that of ray 0t.
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Start from the free-trade equilibrium. Cuba’s imposition of the 100 percent
tariff shifts her effective offer curve down to half its initial level. At the original
terms of trade, there occurs an excess world demand for Cuba’s export good,
sugar, and a corresponding excess world supply of her import good, English
cloth. To eliminate these excess demands and supplies, Cuba’s terms of trade
must improve—and England’s deteriorate—by 100 percent. In the new, tariff-
ridden equilibrium, Cuba imports the same initial amount of cloth at the cost
of only half the initial amount of sugar given up. England, on the other hand,
receives only half the initial amount of sugar at the cost of the same amount of
cloth sacriﬁced. Torrens’ conclusion: Foreign governments can, by means of
tariffs, manipulate reciprocal demands to their advantage and thereby worsen
the other country’s terms of trade.
Having shown how the home country might lose from the foreigner’s tariff,
Torrens next used his reciprocal-demand schedules to argue for reciprocity in
tariff removal (see Figure 7). He pointed out that the home country’s unilateral
abolition of tariffs would, in the face of their existence abroad, only worsen
her terms of trade. He likewise noted that the home country’s retaliatory duties
would cancel the unfavorable terms-of-trade effects of foreign levies. Finally,
he observed that the simultaneous imposition or removal of duties by all coun-
tries tends to leave the terms of trade unchanged. Like today’s proponents of
“a level playing ﬁeld,” he proposed that England counter foreign tariffs with      
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Cuba’s unilateral tariff improves her
terms of trade. Equilibrium moves
from point 1 to point 2. England’s
reciprocal duty shifts her offer curve
leftward and corrects her terms-of-
trade deterioration (point 2 to point 3).
Simultaneous tariff removal by both
parties restores initial equilibrium
without affecting the terms of trade
(point 3 to point 1).
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equal duties of her own, that she trade freely only with countries admitting
her goods duty-free, and that she drop her tariffs only insofar as her trading
partners abolish theirs.
Torrens’ analysis was unsympathetically received by his classical contem-
poraries who feared it would undermine the case for free trade (see O’Brien
[1975], pp. 194–97). They noted that tariff removal would hardly worsen
England’s terms of trade to the extent Torrens claimed if reciprocal-demand
elasticities were, as they believed, greater than one.7 Furthermore, they con-
tended that any adverse terms-of-trade effects of moving toward freer trade
would be more than offset by gains in productivity and competitiveness due to
enhanced international specialization and division of labor. Finally, they noted
that the gist of Torrens’ analysis implied that England should levy not equal but
higher retaliatory duties than those levied abroad to improve her terms of trade.
They saw such action as intensifying the danger of a trade war with all parties
7 To Torrens’ critics, high elasticities stemmed from the availability of numerous alternative
goods and markets in the world economy. Such availability meant that a country could avoid
tariffs levied by its trade partner. The country could divert production from taxed to nontaxed
exports. Or it could export to third, tariff-free countries, competition from which would limit
the tariff-imposing country’s power to manipulate the terms of trade. In short, access to multiple
export outlets and import sources rendered reciprocal demands extremely elastic with respect to
price changes emanating from any single source.       
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losing. In response to the criticism that his analysis aided protectionists, Torrens
rather disingenuously protested that he was a free trader merely applying the
logic of the classical model.
3. ALFRED MARSHALL
Without actually drawing the offer-curve diagram, Mill and Torrens had de-
scribed the workings of its principal components. Indeed, Mill’s account, in
the words of Joseph A. Schumpeter (1954), “reads almost like a somewhat
clumsy instruction for choosing these curves rather than others” (p. 609). It
was Alfred Marshall who took the crucial step of translating Mill’s instructions
into geometry and thus invented the diagram that bears his name.
That Marshall was the ﬁrst to draw the diagram is beyond dispute. What
is disputed is the originality of his contribution. Did his trade diagrams do no
more than merely “polish and develop Mill’s meaning,” as Schumpeter (1954,
p. 609) claimed? Or were they “of such a character in their grasp, comprehen-
siveness and scientiﬁc accuracy” as to put them “far beyond the ‘bright ideas’
of his predecessors,” as John Maynard Keynes ([1925] 1956, p. 24) thought?
Marshall himself disclaimed originality by stressing the Millian pedigree of his
diagrams. “As to International Trade curves,” he wrote, “mine were set to a
deﬁnite tune, that called by Mill” (Pigou [1925] 1956, p. 451). He dismissed
his curves as nothing more than “a diagrammatic treatment of Mill’s problem
of international values” (Pigou [1925] 1956, p. 416).
Of the fourteen diagrams Marshall presented in his Pure Theory of Foreign
Trade (1879), at least ﬁve appear to conﬁrm Schumpeter’s and Marshall’s judg-
ments. For they merely elaborate in elegant and compact geometry what Mill
had already expressed in words and numerical examples. Certainly Mill would
have found unexceptional the curves in Figure 8a just as he would Marshall’s
explanation of their convex (bowed in toward their respective axes) shapes and
their positive slopes. Their convexity, Marshall held, captures the inverse de-
mand relationship between import price and quantity. And their positive slopes
indicate the normal case of elastic demands in which import-sales proceeds—
and thus the quantity of exports produced with the aid of those proceeds—rise
with import-quantity demanded.8
Nor would Mill have been surprised by Figure 8b. There Marshall depicts
a case of inelastic import demand as manifested in a backward-bending offer
curve. Mill would have agreed with Marshall that beyond point B, import-sales
proceeds, and so the export volume they ﬁnance, must fall as import-quantity
demanded rises. He had said much the same thing himself.
8 Marshall always assumed that the price-times-quantity sales receipts of importers pay for
the cost of exports. Import receipts ﬁnance export production.      
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In panel a, both curves are elastic. Import and export quantities rise as the
relative price of imports falls. In panel b, the home curve becomes inelastic
beyond point B. Import quantity rises but export quantity falls with decreases
in the relative price of imports.
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Finally, Mill would have found Marshall’s diagrammatic treatment of trade
taxes totally unsurprising. Marshall showed that when both offer curves are
elastic (provided the foreigner’s is not inﬁnitely so), tariffs and export taxes
always improve the levying country’s terms of trade. He also showed that
when the levying country’s curve cuts the foreigner’s curve in its inelastic
range, a trade tax yields a twofold gain (see Figure 9). The taxer’s terms of
trade improve. And, by obtaining a larger quantity of imports at the sacriﬁce
of a smaller quantity of exports, the taxer has more of both goods to consume
at home. A country lucky enough to face an inelastic foreign offer curve, said
Marshall, has nothing to lose and everything to gain by exploiting it.9 But Mill
had already arrived at these conclusions. Thus Marshall’s diagrammatic tax
analysis goes little beyond Mill’s work on that subject.
9 Marshall assigned a low probability to this case. He thought that (1) international compe-
tition, (2) countries’ ability to shift production from taxed to nontaxed exports, and (3) the option
of trading with third, free-trade nations rendered offer curves highly elastic. Levying countries
were left with little scope for tariff-induced improvements in the terms of trade.    
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The home country imposes a
trade tax that shifts her offer
curve counterclockwise. Her
terms of trade improve. And she
obtains more imports at the cost
of fewer exports given up and
so has more of both goods to
consume at home.
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Scale Economies and Offer Curves
Figures 10 through 13, on the other hand, go far beyond anything Mill or
Torrens had to offer. Figure 10 constitutes what John Chipman (1965) calls
“the ﬁrst fairly rigorous approach to the treatment of scale economies in inter-
national trade” (p. 738). It depicts Marshall’s Exceptional Class II, in which
economies in the production of exportables render the offer curve nonconvex
and subject to irreversible downward shifts.
Let trade expansion move the home country from point R to point T on its
offer curve. The resulting increased export production invokes scale economies
associated with enhanced specialization and division of labor, with improved
know-how (learning by doing), and with use of advanced technology and large
machines. These economies in turn enable the larger quantity of exports to be
produced at lower unit cost than the original quantity. Since unit-cost reductions
pass through into product prices, it follows that scale economies cause export
prices to fall from RV/0V to TU/0U. Such economies account for the inﬂection
points on the offer curve.
Moreover, once the scale economies are put in place, they and their associ-
ated cost reductions cannot be reversed even if output drops back to its original
level. To capture such irreversible path-dependent effects, the offer curve shifts
downward toward the export axis (see dashed line). In short, scale economies    
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producing exports and a
downward shift in the offer
curve.
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constitute a form of technical progress that shifts the offer curve simultaneously
with movements along it. Here was a novel element in offer-curve analysis.
Uniqueness and Stability of Equilibrium
Further conﬁrming Marshall’s originality was his analysis of uniqueness and
stability of offer-curve equilibrium. Indeed, Murray Kemp (1964) calls this
analysis one of “the most remarkable contributions ever made to theoretical
economics” (p. 66). Regarding uniqueness, Marshall noted that there can be
but one equilibrium when both curves are positively sloped and possess no
inﬂexion points (see Figure 11a). Equilibrium is likewise singular when one
curve is elastic and the other inelastic in a certain range (see Figure 11b).
If, however, both curves are inelastic (Figure 11c), or if at least one contains
inﬂexion points (Figure 11d), multiple equilibria may result. Such equilibria,
according to Marshall, are always odd in number. Moreover, they are alternately
stable and unstable, with the stable equilibria ﬂanking the unstable ones (see
Figures 11c and d in which stable equilibrium points A and C ﬂank the unstable
point B).
As for stability of equilibrium, Marshall analyzed it with phase diagrams
superimposed on his offer curves. His phase diagrams—the ﬁrst ever used in
print by an economist—treat points off the curves as disequilibrium phenom-
ena produced by random real shocks such as wars, harvest failures, and the
like. For any given disequilibrium trading point, Marshall sketched the dynamic   
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Panels a and b display cases of unique (singular) equilibrium. Panels c and d
display multiple equilibria, with the stable equilibria (A and C) bounding or
bracketing the unstable one (B).
+
adjustment mechanism that moves the point toward equilibrium. To him, the
propelling force consisted of the proﬁtability of expanding production of exports
when they are in short supply.
Consider trading points to the left of the home country’s curve and below
the foreigner’s curve. Such points represent shortfalls of actual quantities of   
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The shortfall of actual below desired
exports at trading point P stimulates
production of exports and so moves
that point toward equilibrium.
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exports below quantities the countries are willing to offer (see Figure 12). These
shortfalls render exports extraordinarily proﬁtable and induce competitive pro-
ducers to produce more. The resulting export expansion moves the trading point
toward the curves just as—to use Marshall’s analogy—the force of magnetic
attraction moves metal ﬁlings toward a rigid wire. The arrows point rightward
and upward to indicate the trading point’s movement.
Conversely, disequilibrium trading points to the right of the home country’s
curve and above the foreigner’s curve spell surpluses of actual over desired ex-
ports. The resulting losses bring declines in export production as shown by the
leftward and downward direction of the arrows.
In all cases, the directional arrows indicate whether trading points will
move away from or toward their neighboring equilibria (see Figure 13). On the
basis of such analysis, Marshall concluded that every equilibrium intersection
is stable except those in which (1) both curves slope in the same direction and
(2) the foreign curve is more nearly vertical than the domestic one (see Amano
[1968], pp. 327–28).
Surplus Analysis of Gains from Trade
Further proof of Marshall’s originality is his diagrammatic treatment of the
gains from trade. In a straightforward application of his concept of consumer
surplus, he expressed such gains as the excess of the maximum prices a coun-
try would be willing to pay for successive units of imports over the market
price, or terms of trade, it actually pays. Accordingly, he devised a technique        
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The directional arrows indicate
whether disequilibrium trading
points move toward their stable
or away from their unstable
neighboring equilibria.
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for projecting from the offer curve a series of unit surpluses into a triangle
resembling the area lying between an ordinary Marshallian demand curve and
the price line (see Figure 14). Expressed in terms of export quantities, the
resulting triangular area UHA sums the excesses of the maximum unit prices
over the prevailing terms of trade shown by the slope of the ray through the
trade equilibrium point A. This was his measure of the net beneﬁt a country
derives from trade.10
Assessment
It should be obvious by now that Keynes was right. Marshall’s diagrams were
more than a mere reﬁnement of Mill’s analysis. They were a major innovation
and a powerful aid to theorizing. The mystery is why Marshall himself refused
to acknowledge as much. Perhaps a desire to stress the intellectual continuity
of trade theory led him to disguise his contribution modestly as part of the
accumulated wisdom of his classical predecessors. Or perhaps his reluctance to
claim originality for his diagrams stemmed from a puritanical sense of guilt over
the pleasure he derived from them. Jacob Viner (1941) writes that mathematics,
10 Actually, Marshall divided the surplus triangle by the distance 0D to correct for the
arbitrary choice of point D. That point ﬁxes the location of the vertical line used in projecting
unit price surpluses onto the quasi-demand curve UPA.     
T. M. Humphrey: Early Contributions to Offer-Curve Analysis 59





























The maximum price the
country is willing to pay for
successive units of imports
ranges from the slope of the
top ray to the slope of the
bottom one. A mapping of the
excess of these unit prices
over the equilibrium terms of
trade forms the surplus
triangle UHA'. The net gain
from trade is measured by the
triangle UHA' divided by the
distance 0D, which corrects
for the arbitrary choice of the
location of the projection
line DR.
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especially geometry, yielded Marshall “so much intellectual and aesthetic
delight that it for that reason alone became somewhat suspect to him as a worth-
while occupation. Mathematics, and especially graphs, were Marshall’s ﬂesh-
pots, and if he frequently succumbed to their lure it was not without struggle
with his conscience. . . . [W]hen he did succumb he . . . warned his readers not
to take his mathematical adventures too seriously” (p. 231). Keynes agreed. He
pointed out that when Marshall’s “intellect chased diagrams and Foreign Trade
and Money, there was an evangelical moralizer of an imp somewhere inside
him, that was so ill-advised as to disapprove” ([1925] 1956, p. 37). But dis-
approve Marshall did and in so doing disclaimed originality for his invention.
4. FRANCIS YSIDRO EDGEWORTH
As sophisticated as they were, Marshall’s offer curves lacked clear grounding
in the underlying utility functions. Credit for establishing these foundations and
for introducing utility considerations into the diagram goes to F. Y. Edgeworth,
Marshall’s colleague and the inventor of the indifference map and the contract
curve.
Edgeworth’s earliest work on the diagram appears on pages 113–14 of his
Mathematical Psychics (1881). There he derived offer curves for two repre-
sentative price-taking individuals. Each possesses (1) a ﬁxed endowment of    
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goods and (2) a utility function described by a consumption indifference map.
Like trade theorists today, Edgeworth deﬁned each individual’s offer curve as
the locus of points of tangency of indifference curves and the price ray as it
pivots about the origin (see Figure 15). Each point represents an outcome of
constrained utility maximization in which the price ratio, or slope of the price
ray, equals the ratio of marginal utilities, or slope of the indifference curves.
In the same diagram, he demonstrated that the offer curves must intersect on
the contract curve, or locus of points at which one trader’s indifference curves
are tangent to the other’s. Along the contract curve, neither trader’s utility can
be increased without reducing the other’s. In demonstrating that offer curves
intersect on the contract curve, Edgeworth proved that price-taking equilibrium
is efﬁcient in the sense that both traders together cannot be made better off by
another outcome. Moreover, since the equilibrium outcome lies between the
two indifference curves passing through the origin, or endowment point, where
no trade occurs, he also proved that free trade leaves each party at least as well
off as no trade.
He next extended this latter insight to measure a single country’s gain
from trade. In so doing he provided an alternative to Marshall’s measure of
the gain. In his 1889 Journal of the Royal Statistical Society article, “On the




















Offer curves intersect on the
contract curve CC'. At free-
trade equilibrium, both traders
occupy indifference curves
superior to those going through
the origin or endowment point
where no trade occurs.
+    
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Application of Mathematics to Political Economy,” he drew a community trade
indifference curve passing through the origin (see Figure 16). This curve, of
course, shows all combinations of exports and imports that leave the country no
better off than if it refrained from trade. The vertical distance between this “no
gain from trade” curve and the country’s offer curve—or rather the indifference
contour going through it—at free-trade equilibrium measures the utility gain
from trade.


















The vertical distance between the
trade equilibrium point and the
foreigner’s “no gain from trade”
indifference curve–the particular
curve passing through the
origin–constitutes the foreigner’s
utility gain from trade.
+
Optimum-Tariff Analysis
The foregoing pathbreaking innovations were but a prelude to Edgeworth’s
crowning achievement—his geometrical demonstration of the optimum-tariff
argument. An optimum tariff, of course, maximizes the excess of the gains
from terms-of-trade improvement over the loss from lower trade volume and
reduced international specialization and division of labor. The idea itself goes
back to Mill and Torrens. They had argued that a large country caring only
for its own welfare and facing an imperfectly elastic foreign demand schedule
could exploit its monopoly power in world markets through such a tariff. But
rigorous diagrammatic illustration of the argument was lacking until Edgeworth
provided it in his 1894 Economic Journal article, “The Theory of International
Values, II.”    
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The optimum tariff puts the
levying country on the point
where its highest attainable
trade indifference curve is
tangent to the foreigner’s
offer curve.
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His demonstration begins with the home country’s trade indifference curve
passing through the free-trade point where the offer curves intersect (see Figure
17). That particular indifference curve indicates the level of welfare or satisfac-
tion the home country enjoys under free trade. It provides a benchmark against
which to compare alternative welfare levels produced by different degrees of
trade restriction.
It also, together with the foreign offer curve, speciﬁes the range of tariff
rates beneﬁcial to the home country. In this connection, Edgeworth noted that
the same indifference curve that passes through the free-trade point P also
cuts the foreign offer curve at point M. That latter point therefore yields the
same level of welfare as free trade. Since all points on the foreign offer curve
between these two extremes lie on higher indifference curves, it follows that
any movement to a position between points P and M will result in the home
country being better off than under free trade. In other words, points P and M
mark the range of tariff-induced terms-of-trade improvement beneﬁcial to the
home country. Somewhere within this range, beneﬁt is at a maximum.
Edgeworth identiﬁed this maximum with point Q, the point where the home
country reaches its highest possible trade indifference curve given the foreign
offer curve. The optimum tariff, he argued, is that which distorts the home    
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country’s offer curve such that it intersects the foreign offer curve at this point
of tangency with the highest attainable indifference curve. Here is the famous
tangency solution to the determination of the optimum tariff.
Edgeworth then showed that if the tariff is too high, it reduces rather than
increases welfare. Suppose the country progressively raises its tariff from the
zero rate corresponding to point P to positive rates corresponding to points
Q and M. As it does so, it ﬁnds that its welfare ﬁrst rises, then reaches a
maximum, and ﬁnally starts to fall. If it persists in raising the rate beyond that
corresponding to point M, it will discover that its welfare has fallen below the
level attained at the free-trade position P. It follows that the tariff must not be
too large if the nation is to beneﬁt.
Finally, Edgeworth noted some pitfalls to the practical application of his
diagram. First, the optimum tariff, though precisely identiﬁed in theory, cannot
be ascertained with any accuracy in practice. Second, protectionists will exert
strong political pressure on policymakers to raise tariffs far beyond the opti-
mum point, thereby reducing welfare. Third, retaliation by foreign countries
may erase any gains generated by the tariff. Fourth, viewed from a global
standpoint, tariffs are harmful since other countries lose more than the levying
country gains. For these reasons, free trade remains the best and most practical
policy for a country to pursue.
Alleged Asymmetry of Export and Import Taxes
No scholar is infallible, not even one of Edgeworth’s stature. In the very
same Economic Journal article containing his optimum-tariff demonstration,
Edgeworth (1894b) committed a celebrated error. He rejected the standard
proposition that export and import taxes are equivalent in the sense of having
identical real effects. Other leading classical and neoclassical theorists, includ-
ing Mill, Marshall, A. C. Pigou, and C. F. Bastable, took such equivalence for
granted. But Edgeworth alleged that the two taxes shift the dutying country’s
offer curve differently and therefore have disparate real effects.
According to Edgeworth, export taxes shift the curve horizontally to the
left. But import taxes shift it vertically upward such that it lies everywhere
above the original curve. The result is that the tax-ridden curves intersect the
foreign offer curve at different points, especially when both foreign and do-
mestic curves are in their inelastic ranges (see Figure 18). In such cases, the
export tax-ridden equilibrium lies to the northwest of the free-trade point so
that the levying country is on a higher indifference curve with better terms
of trade. By contrast, the import tax-ridden equilibrium lies to the southeast
of the free-trade point, putting the country on a lower indifference curve with
worsened terms of trade. Such was Edgeworth’s allegation.
It took 42 years to identify and correct Edgeworth’s error. Abba Lerner
ﬁnally did so in his classic 1936 paper, “The Symmetry Between Import and   
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Edgeworth alleged that an export tax shifts the home country’s offer curve
horizontally to the left whereas an import tax shifts it vertically. As a result,
the export tax moves the home country to a superior position (better terms of
trade and a higher indifference curve), whereas the import tax moves her to
an inferior position.
+
Export Taxes.” There Lerner argued, contrary to Edgeworth, that export and
import taxes indeed affect the offer curve identically. They thus have symmet-
rical effects on the volume and the terms of trade. Differential effects stem not
from the taxes per se. Rather they stem from how the government disposes of
the revenue. The greater the proportion spent on the levying country’s export
good, the greater the improvement in its welfare and terms of trade. Conversely,
the greater the proportion spent on imports, the smaller the improvement. Edge-
worth’s ﬁrst result obtains when all the proceeds are spent on export goods;
his second when all are spent on imports. His error lay in confusing these
expenditure effects for tax effects. What he saw as differential results of trade
taxes were really outcomes of how the government spent the revenue.        
T. M. Humphrey: Early Contributions to Offer-Curve Analysis 65
5. ABBA LERNER
Lerner (1936) established the foregoing results by means of the ingenious
device of a geometrical pencil, or wedge, superimposed on the offer curves
(see Figure 19). Consisting of two price radiants, the pencil expresses the tax-
induced divergence between world and domestic relative prices. Its width shows
the rate of the tax. Its location on the offer curves depicts the government’s
apportionment of the proceeds between exportable goods and imports. And its
position around the free-trade price ray shows how tax imposition and disposal
affects the terms of trade and domestic relative prices. Finally, the pencil em-
bodies the symmetry notion that export taxes are equivalent to import taxes of















The pencil R' 0R represents
the tax wedge between world
and domestic relative prices.
The pencil’s dimensions are
the same whether the tax is
levied on imports or exports.
The arms of right angle CTU
correspond to the proportions
of the tax revenue that the
government spends on the
two goods.
+
the same percentage rate. Since both taxes produce the same divergence be-
tween world and domestic prices in a two-good model, the pencil’s dimensions
are the same measured in either tax.11 What matters is not which good is taxed
but how the government disposes of the tax proceeds.
11 A tax on imports renders them dearer at home than abroad. By contrast, a tax on exports
raises their foreign price, thus making them cheaper at home than abroad. But a fall in the relative
price of exports is equivalent to a rise in the relative price of imports in Lerner’s two-good model.
Hence, an export tax raises the domestic real price of imports above the world price just as does
an import tax. The two taxes are symmetrical.     
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Lerner’s demonstration of this point was at once seminal and deﬁnitive.
Inserting the pencil into the offer curves, he obtained a right angle CTU con-
necting the points of entry of the pencil’s radiants. This right angle has a special
meaning. Its vertical and horizontal arms measure the world excess supplies
of the two goods resulting from the tax. Market-clearing equilibrium requires
that the government eliminate these excess supplies by consuming them in the
proportion in which they occur. That is, world market equilibrium obtains when
the ratio of the lengths of the right angle’s arms matches the ratio in which the
government consumes the two goods.
Lerner took this latter ratio as given and known. Then he found equilibrium
by pivoting the pencil about the origin until the matching right angle appeared.
For example, suppose the government spends the tax proceeds equally on ex-
ports and imports. Then, following Lerner, swing the pencil until it yields a
right angle whose arms are of equal length (see lines CT and TU in all panels
of Figure 20). Alternatively, suppose the government spends all the proceeds
on exportables such that the right angle reduces to a horizontal line. Then rotate
the pencil counterclockwise until it yields a ﬂat line traversing the pencil and
meeting the offer curves (see lines C1U1 in all panels). Finally, suppose the
government spends all the proceeds on imports so that the right angle reduces
to a vertical line. Then swivel the pencil clockwise until it yields a vertical line
between the offer curves (see lines C2U2 in all panels). In each case, Lerner
examined the resulting location of the pencil’s radiants relative to the free-trade
price ray passing through the point of offer-curve intersection. These indicate
how the disposition of the tax affects the terms of trade and domestic price
ratio, respectively. Radiants to the left of the free-trade ray represent a fall and
those to the right a rise in post-tax relative prices.
Standard Tariff Propositions
Employing this technique, Lerner derived four key propositions of standard
tariff theory. His derivation marks a turning point in the diagram’s history. Be-
fore him, the diagram was largely regarded as an esoteric tool employed by a
select circle of economists. After him, it was seen as a conventional instrument
and widely used. His work, more than any other, convinced the economics
profession of the diagram’s power and versatility as an analytical tool.
His standard propositions are as follows. First, provided both offer curves
are elastic but not inﬁnitely so, a trade tax, no matter how spent, improves the
levying country’s terms of trade and raises the domestic relative price of its
imports (see Figure 20a). In other words, the radiants of the pencil encompass
the free-trade price ray.
Second, regardless of elasticities, a tariff improves the terms of trade more
(or worsens it less) the larger the fraction of the tax spent on the country’s
exportable good. Thus, the pencil’s upper radiant lies more to the left (or less  
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The pairs of C-U points show where the upper and lower radiants of the pencil
enter the offer curves. Pairs C
1-U
1, C-U, and C
2-U
2 correspond to tax proceeds
allocated all, some, and none, respectively, to exportables. Taxes and their
disposal improve the terms of trade when radiants through the C points lie to
the left of the free-trade ray (not shown) that passes through the point of offer-
curve intersection. Taxes and their disposal raise the domestic relative price of
imports when radiants through the U points lie to the right of the free-trade ray.
+
0 x        
68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
to the right) of the free-trade ray as it passes through points C1,C, and C2,
representing export expenditure shares of one, half, and none, respectively (see
Figure 20, all panels).
Third, suppose the taxing country spends all the tax on imports and pos-
sesses an inelastic import demand, or backward-bending offer curve. In this
case, a trade tax actually worsens the terms of trade. Geometrically, the radiant
passing through point C2 lies to the right of the free-trade ray (see Figure 20b
and d). Indeed, one can relax the assumption that all the tax is allocated to
imports. Lerner’s result holds as long as the taxer’s import-demand elasticity
is less than the fraction of the proceeds spent on imports.12
Fourth, assume the home country faces an inelastic foreign offer curve and
spends its tariff proceeds largely on its exportable good. In this case, a tariff
may improve the terms of trade by more than the tariff such that the domestic
price of imports falls below its free-trade level. Geometrically, the radiant pass-
ing through point U1 lies to the left of the free-trade ray (see Figure 20b and
c). If so, the tariff achieves the opposite of its intended purpose. By lowering
the domestic price of imports, it harms rather than protects domestic import-
competing industries and the relatively scarce factors they employ intensively.
Today, textbooks attribute this paradoxical result to Lloyd Metzler. He proved,
in 1949, that it holds when the dutying country’s marginal propensity to spend
the tariff proceeds on its own export good exceeds the foreigner’s elasticity of
demand for that good.13 But it was Lerner, not Metzler, who ﬁrst established
this proposition.
6. CONTROVERSIES IN THE 1920S AND 1930S
Offer curves also constituted the focus of Frank Graham’s (1923, 1932) cele-
brated critique of Marshall’s work. Graham’s critique raised issues not fully
resolved until the 1950s.
The ﬁrst issue concerned the effects of demand-induced shifts in the home
country’s curve. In Appendix J of his 1923 Money, Credit and Commerce,
Marshall analyzed such shifts stemming from autonomous increases in import
demand. He argued that the resulting extent of terms-of-trade deterioration
would vary directly with the home import-demand elasticity and inversely with
12 A high import-expenditure fraction augments the demand for imports and tends to raise
their relative price. But a low elasticity spells little offsetting fall in import-quantity demanded
in response to the higher price. The resulting excess demand for imports raises their price and
causes the terms of trade to deteriorate.
13 The government’s high propensity to spend on its exportable puts upward pressure on the
domestic (and world) price of that good. But the low foreign demand elasticity militates against
offsetting falls in quantity demanded abroad in response to the higher price. The net result is an
excess demand for exportables. This excess demand raises the relative price of exports and lowers
its inverse, the relative price of imports.  
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the foreign one. Similarly, he thought the accompanying degree of expansion
in trade volume would vary directly with both elasticities.
Graham, however, disagreed. He thought that the extent of terms-of-trade
deterioration would vary inversely with both elasticities. He also thought trade-
volume expansion would vary directly with the foreign elasticity but inversely
with the home elasticity.
How could two leading economists differ over something as elementary as
the effects of shifts of offer curves? Murray Kemp supplied the answer in 1956.
The disagreement stemmed from ambiguity of the phrase “increase in reciprocal
demand.” More precisely, it stemmed from Marshall’s failure to state explicitly
the type of shift postulated. It turns out that he implicitly posited horizontal
shifts due to increases in the quantity of exports offered against a given quantity
of imports. By contrast, Graham posited equiproportional or radial shifts due to
increases in the quantity of exports offered at given terms of trade. Both were
right in terms of their own implicit deﬁnitions. Still, the controversy taught the
economics profession a lesson. Elasticity affects the extent to which demand
shifts alter price and quantity. Exactly how it does so depends on the precise
deﬁnition of such shifts (see Bhagwati and Johnson [1960], p. 78).
The second issue concerned the link between offer curves and the underly-
ing production conditions. Graham accused Marshall, Mill, and their followers
of neglecting these conditions and overemphasizing demand. But this accusa-
tion was hardly fair since Marshall and the others always viewed the offer curve
as embodying an exhaustive classiﬁcation of all its determinants, supply as well
as demand. True, Edgeworth initially derived Marshallian curves for a pure ex-
change economy involving no production. But he later explicitly acknowledged
underlying changes in production in his famous analogy comparing Marshall’s
offer curves to the hands of a clock driven by the workings of a complex but
hidden machinery.
The full revelation of the machinery, however, had to wait for the famous
demonstrations of Leontief (1933) and Meade (1952). Both derived offer curves
from production transformation frontiers (expressing supply conditions) and
consumption indifference curves (expressing demand conditions).
Leontief’s derivation was the simplest. He superimposed a trading coun-
try’s consumption indifference curves directly on its transformation curve. He
then assumed alternative international price ratios represented by negatively
sloped lines. Tangency of such lines with the transformation and indifference
curves gave him the quantities of the two goods produced and consumed at
each price ratio. The excess of production over consumption of the one good
and of consumption over production of the other at each price ratio constituted
export-import bundles lying on the offer curve.
Meade, on the other hand, derived offer curves in two stages (see Figure
21). First, he slid a transformation curve, or production block, along a succes-
sion of consumption indifference curves. The origin of the block traced out a set    
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of trade indifference curves, each curve showing alternative export-import
bundles that yield the same level of collective satisfaction. From these trade
indifference curves he derived offer curves just as Edgeworth had done. He
found the locus of points of tangency of trade indifference curves and alterna-
tive price rays emanating from the origin. This locus constituted the offer curve.
In deriving the curves from the underlying production conditions, Leontief and
Meade vindicated Marshall and exonerated him from Graham’s charge.
7. CONCLUSION
Historically, the offer-curve apparatus has been put to two uses. Modern ana-
lysts employ it as a pedagogical or expository device to illustrate established
truths. By contrast, the concept’s originators applied it as an analytical tool to
derive new propositions and postulates. They used it to generate key theorems
on the gains from trade, on the efﬁciency of free-trade equilibrium, on the
effects of tariffs and technological change on the terms of trade, and on the
speciﬁcation of the optimum rate of a tariff. That they were able to do so using
nothing more sophisticated than numerical examples and geometrical diagrams
shows what keen minds can accomplish with the simplest of analytical tools.    
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Their successive accomplishments typify the workings of normal science
wherein the drive to perfect an existing paradigm propels advances in theory. In
their case, the paradigm consisted of the Mill-Marshall model of terms-of-trade
determination. Perfecting it meant (1) making it more precise, (2) generalizing
it to cover the widest possible range of cases, and (3) purging it of errors and
inconsistencies.
Offer-curve pioneers were more than up to these tasks. Thus Mill’s and
Torrens’ concept of reciprocal demand expunged terms-of-trade indeterminacy
from Ricardo’s analysis. Mill generalized Torrens’ unit-elastic demand sched-
ules to include elasticities ranging from zero to inﬁnity. Marshall generalized
Mill’s model to cover cases of (1) multiple as well as singular equilibrium and
(2) nonconstant as well as constant costs. Edgeworth’s invention of indifference
maps and the contract curve lent precision to Marshall’s concept of the gains
from trade. Lerner’s innovation, the tax pencil, helped correct Edgeworth’s error
regarding the symmetry of trade taxes. Finally, Leontief and Meade extended
the entire apparatus to include production as well as preference functions.
The result was that offer curves became a ﬁxture of trade theory and a com-
monplace of textbooks. The survival of the concept testiﬁes to its continued
usefulness. Modern students owe the originators of this tool a debt of gratitude.
Even today, if one understands the diagram, one comprehends how various
disturbances—technology shocks, resource discoveries, taste shifts, erection
and removal of trade barriers, and the like—affect the volume and terms of
world trade.
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